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Abstract
Recent results have shown that structured codes can be used to construct good channel codes,
source codes and physical layer network codes for Gaussian channels. For Gaussian channels with
secrecy constraints, however, efforts to date rely on random codes. In this work, we advocate that
structured codes are useful for providing secrecy, and show how to compute the secrecy rate when
structured codes are used. In particular, we solve the problem of bounding equivocation rates with one
important class of structured codes, i.e., nested lattice codes. Having established this result, we next
demonstrate the use of structured codes for secrecy in two-user Gaussian channels. In particular, with
structured codes, we prove that a positive secure degree of freedom is achievable for a large class of
fully connected Gaussian channels as long as the channel is not degraded. By way of this, for these
channels, we establish that structured codes outperform Gaussian random codes at high SNR. This class
of channels include the two-user multiple access wiretap channel, the two-user interference channel with
confidential messages and the two-user interference wiretap channel. A notable consequence of this result
is that, unlike the case with Gaussian random codes, using structured codes for both transmission and
cooperative jamming, it is possible to achieve an arbitrary large secrecy rate given enough power.
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submitted in part to IEEE Globecom Conference in March, 2009. This work is supported in part by the National Science
Foundation with Grants CCR-0237727, CCF-051483, CNS-0716325, CNS-0721445 and the DARPA ITMANET Program with
Grant W911NF-07-1-0028.
2I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information theoretic secrecy was first proposed by Shannon [1] whereby
a message transmitted to a receiver is guaranteed to be kept secret from an eavesdropper,
irrespective of the computational power it possesses. In particular, it was shown that it is possible
that the eavesdropper gains no information regarding the secret message having intercepted the
cryptogram, albeit at the expense of very long keys [1]. Wyner, in [2], established that, more often
than not, the eavesdropper (Eve) has a noisy copy of the signal transmitted from the source, and
exploiting the channels, building a useful secure communication system per Shannon’s notion is
possible [2]. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3] extended Wyner’s setting to the general discrete memoryless
wiretap channel and established its secrecy capacity.
Numerous channel models have since been studied using the information theoretic secrecy
framework. The maximum reliable transmission rate with secrecy was identified for some basic
models including the Gaussian wiretap channel [4], the MIMO wiretap channel [5], [6] and
the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages [7], [8]. Generally speaking,
secrecy capacity regions for multi-transmitter models remain as open problems, though some
specific cases are solved, e.g., sum secrecy capacity for a degraded Gaussian multiple access
wiretap channel [9], [10]. For other channels, upper bounds, lower bounds and some asymptotic
results on the secrecy capacity exist, see for example [11]–[16]. For the achievability part,
Shannon’s random coding argument proves to be effective in these works.
On the other hand, it is known that the random coding argument may be insufficient to prove
capacity theorems for certain channels [17], and that the use of structured codes, e.g., lattice
codes, is called for. This body of work suggests that using structured codes has two benefits:
First, it is relatively easy to analyze large networks with these codes. For example, in [18], [19],
the lattice code allows the relaying scheme to be equivalent to a modulus sum operation, making
it easy to trace the signal over a multi-hop relay network. Secondly, the structured nature of
these codes makes it possible to align unwanted interference, for example, in the interference
channel with more than two users [20]–[23], and the two-way relay channel [18], [19].
A natural question therefore is whether structured codes are useful for secret communication
as well, that is whether imposing a structure on the codebook carries any inherent advantage
from the secrecy perspective. In this work, we shall answer this question positively and present
3a structured coding scheme, for which we will be able to compute the secrecy rate. Furthermore,
we will demonstrate that there are channel models where the secrecy rates offered by structured
codes outperform that of simple random codes, in particular, for channel models with additive
Gaussian noise.
A large body of recent work point to the usefulness of lattice codes for Gaussian channels
without secrecy [17]–[19], [21], [22]. However, computing the secrecy rate for lattice codes is
especially challenging for Gaussian channels. The challenge arises from the manner in which
the channel operates which is natural addition. In contrast, for a modulus channel setting, the
analysis and the result follows in a relatively straightforward manner [24]. For example, reference
[24] considers the wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer in a modulus channel where the
source node uses lattice codes to send the secret message and the cooperative jammer uses lattice
codes as a jamming signal to confuse the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper observes the modulus
sum of the code and the jamming signal, where the sum operation is defined over a finite group.
In this setting, the observation of the eavesdropper is independent from the secret message as
in the case of the one-time pad in [1], and the secrecy rate computation can be done as shown
in [24]. However, as commented in [24], in a Gaussian channel, the eavesdropper receives the
sum of the signal from the source and the jamming signal, where the sum operation is over
the N-dimensional real space rather than over a finite group. The property of independence
is therefore lost and the method in [24] no longer applies. While one might attempt to use a
brute-force method to compute the secrecy rate for finite N , lattice codes in general offer the
largest rate when the dimension N →∞, and this makes designing any such brute-force method
impractical.
The first contribution of this work is to solve the problem of secrecy rate computation when
the lattice codes are employed.
Most lattice codes for power constrained transmission have a similar structure to the one
used in [24]. First, a lattice is constructed, which should be a good channel code for the
noise/interference. Then, to satisfy the power constraint, the lattice, or its shifted version, is
intersected with a bounded set, called the shaping set, to create a set of lattice points with finite
average power. Commonly used shaping sets include the sphere or its shell [21], and in the
case of nested lattice code, the fundamental region of a lattice [25]. The choice of the shaping
set, in general, does not result in significant performance difference when there are no secrecy
4constraints. However, as we show in this work, one shaping set is amenable to secrecy rate
analysis. In particular, we prove that using nested lattice codes, the real sum of two lattice points
from the same codebook leaks at most 1 bit of information per channel use to the eavesdropper
regarding the value of one of the lattice points, if the other point is independently generated and
uniformly distributed over the codebook. This result allows bounding of the equivocation rate
and opens the door for applying nested lattice codes to achieve secrecy in Gaussian channels.
The second contribution of this work is that we show, for a large class of two-user Gaussian
channels with real channel gains, structured codes provide unbounded gains in secrecy rate as
compared to randomly generated Gaussian codebooks at high SNR.
We consider a Gaussian wiretap channel when there is an external transmitter that can help
jam the eavesdropper, i.e., a cooperative jammer. This model is significant in that it can be
viewed as a special case of many two-user Gaussian channel models with interference and
secrecy constraints, including the Gaussian MAC-wiretap channel [12], the Gaussian interference
channel with confidential messages [26] and the Gaussian interference channel with an external
eavesdropper [27, Section VI], [16]. This channel, which is also called the interference assisted
wiretap channel in reference [28], is interesting also because it retains the essence of the problem
on the trade-off between secrecy and interference. It is known that introducing interference via
a cooperative jamming node into the channel may increase the uncertainty observed by the
adversary and hence allow for a higher rate of secret messages [12], [13], [26], [28], [29].
However, to harvest this benefit, the interference should be introduced in an intelligent way such
that it is more harmful to the adversary than it is to the intended receiver of the messages.
Hence, the key is to achieve a fine balance between secrecy against adversary and harmful
interference to the intended receiver. The current state of art is such that the achieved rate is still
far from the outer bounds for this model [28], despite recent efforts [30]. For example, the genie
outer bound from [28] increases with power P at the speed of 0.5 log2(P ) [30, (69)], while the
achievable secrecy rate converges to a constant when P →∞ [28, Theorem 2]. This means the
gap between the achievable rate and the outer bound is unbounded and the trade-off between
secrecy and interference is not well-understood. In fact, once the channel model is such that
the intended receiver is not harmed by the introduced interference, the achieved secrecy rate
immediately comes within 0.5 bits/channel use of the capacity region, as was shown for the one
sided interference channel in [31], the orthogonal MAC wiretap channel in [27] and the two-hop
5relay channel in [32] when the power of relay is large.
Since the gap between the achievable secrecy rate and its outer bound is most pronounced
at high SNR, in this work, we shall use secure degree of freedom as the performance measure,
which shows the high SNR behavior of the achievable secrecy rate. For a fading interference
channel, using interference alignment [33] and fading across the channel states, reference [34]
demonstrates that the secure degree of freedom can be made positive. However, in the absence
of channel variations, the method in [34] does not apply and as described above, reference
[28] shows that the achieved rate using Gaussian codebooks converges to a constant as power
increases, which implies the obtained secure degree of freedom with Gaussian signalling is zero.
In this work, using structured codes, we prove that a strictly positive degree of freedom is
achievable for this case, as long as the channel model is fully connected and not degraded. This
means that with the help of only one cooperative jammer, given enough power, an arbitrarily
large secrecy rate is achievable for a Gaussian wiretap channel.
In obtaining our results we consider all possible channel gain configurations with a fully
connected channel model. The signaling scheme we find that yields the largest achieved secure
degree of freedom calls for a partial alignment scheme, in which part of the interference is
actually aligned with the intended signal. A final note is that, in this work, for the purpose of
completeness, we also utilize integer lattices whenever necessary, as they can achieve a larger
secure degree of freedom for a certain set of channel gain configurations of measure zero. This
is mainly a consequence of their simple structure, for which the equivocation can be computed
precisely, while for the nested lattice code the equivocation can only be bounded.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the mathematical tool found
to bound the secrecy rate when nested lattice codes are used. Section III describes the wiretap
channel model with a cooperative jammer. Section IV derives the secure degree of freedom
with nested lattice codes. Section V compares it with the secure degree of freedom achieved by
integer lattice and points out the cases where integer lattice is useful. Section VI computes the
secrecy rate with finite power and demonstrates the advantage of the structured coding scheme
over random Gaussian signaling even with moderate SNR. In Section VII, we discuss the effect
of imperfect channel state information. Section VIII discusses the channel model with complex
channel gains. Section IX concludes the paper. Main proofs are presented in Appendices for
clarity.
6II. RESULTS ON NESTED LATTICE CODES
A nested lattice code is defined as an intersection of an N-dimensional “fine” lattice Λ and the
fundamental region of an N-dimensional “coarse” lattice Λc, denoted by V(Λc). Λ,Λc ⊂ RN .
The term “nested” comes from the fact that Λc ⊂ Λ. The modulus operation is defined as the
quantization error of a point x with respect to the coarse lattice Λc:
x mod Λc = x− argmin
u∈Λc
‖x− u‖2 (1)
where ‖x− y‖2 is the Euclidean distance between x and y in RN . It can be verified that Λ∩V(Λc)
is a finite Abelian group when the addition operation between two elements x, y ∈ Λ ∩ V(Λc)
is defined as
x+ y mod Λc (2)
The signal XN transmitted over N channel uses from a nested lattice codebook is given by
XN = (uN + dN) mod Λc (3)
Here uN is the lattice point chosen from Λ ∩ V(Λc), and dN is called the dithering vector.
Conventionally, dN is defined as a continuous random vector which is uniformly distributed
over V(Λc) [25]. We show in Appendix C that for the channel models considered in this work,
a fixed dithering vector can be used. Either way, the nature of dN will not affect the result
described below. In the following, we assume uN is independent from dN . We also assume that
dN is perfectly known by all receiving nodes, and hence, is not used to enhance secrecy.
As will be shown later, our goal in general will be to bound the expression of the form
I(uN1 ;X
N
1 ±XN2 , dN1 , dN2 ) (4)
which will correspond to the rate of information leaked to the eavesdropper. Here uNi , XNi , dNi
correspond to the uN , XN , dN mentioned above respectively. That is to say that uNi ∈ Λ∩V(Λc);
dNi is the dithering noise; XNi = (uNi +dNi ) mod Λc. In addition, uNi , dNi , i = 1, 2 are independent.
To bound (4), we start from the following result, which we will term the representation theorem
from here on:
Theorem 1: Let t1, t2, ..., tK be K numbers taken from the fundamental region of a given
lattice Λ. There exists a integer T , such that 1 ≤ T ≤ KN , and K∑
k=1
tk is uniquely determined
by {T, K∑
k=1
tk mod Λ}.
7Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Remark 1: As shown in its proof, Theorem 1 is a purely algebraic result and does not rely
on the statistics of t1, t2, ...tK .
When K = 2, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1: For XNi , i = 1, 2 computed according to (3), i.e., XNi = (uNi + dNi ) mod Λc,
there exists an integer T , such that 1 ≤ T ≤ 2N , and XN1 ± XN2 is uniquely determined by
{T,XN1 ±XN2 mod Λc}.
Proof: Define −Λc = {−x : x ∈ Λc}. Since 0 ∈ Λc and the difference of any two
lattice points is a lattice point, we have −Λc = Λc. This means that if XN2 ∈ V(Λc) , then
−XN2 ∈ V(−Λc). Since −Λc = Λc, this means that −XN2 ∈ V(Λc) . Hence the corollary follows
from Theorem 1 by letting tN1 = XN1 and tN2 = ±XN2 .
Using Corollary 1, we have
I(uN1 ;X
N
1 ±XN2 , dN1 , dN2 ) (5)
=I(uN1 ;X
N
1 ±XN2 mod Λc, T, dN1 , dN2 ) (6)
≤I(uN1 ;XN1 ±XN2 mod Λc, dN1 , dN2 ) +H(T ) (7)
=I(uN1 ; u
N
1 ± uN2 mod Λc) +H(T ) (8)
Here the T in (6) is the integer defined in Corollary 1.
Since Λ∩V(Λc) is an Abelian group, when uN2 is independent from uN1 , and uN2 is uniformly
distributed over Λ ∩ V(Λc), we have [24], [35]:
I(uN1 ; u
N
1 ± uN2 mod Λc) = 0 (9)
Applying it to (8), we find (5) is upper bounded by
H(T ) ≤ N (10)
Equations (6)-(10) imply
1
N
I
(
uN1 ;X
N
1 ±XN2 , dN1 , dN2
)
≤ 1 (11)
Hence, if the eavesdropper observes XN1 ±XN2 and knows dNi , i = 1, 2, it can obtain at most 1
bit information per channel use regarding the value of uN1 , if uN2 is independently from uN1 and
uniformly distributed over Λ ∩ V(Λc). We will use this result extensively in the sequel.
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Fig. 1. The Gaussian Wiretap Channel with a Cooperative Jammer
III. THE GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH A COOPERATIVE JAMMER
A. System Model and Metric
Consider the Gaussian wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer [28] shown in Figure 1. In
this model, node S1 sends a message W1 via X˜1 to node D1, which must be kept secret from
node D2. Node S2, the cooperative jammer, sends signal X2. We assume the channel is fully
connected, which means that none of the channel gains equals zero. This assumption is valid
for the wireless medium. After normalizing the channel gains of the two intended links to 1, the
received signals at the two receiving node D1 and D2 can be expressed as
Y˜1 = X˜1 +
√
aX2 + Z1
Y2 =
√
bX˜1 ±X2 + Z2
(12)
where Zi, i = 1, 2 is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with unit variance, and
√
a,
√
b and
Zi are real numbers.
Let Wˆ1 be the estimate of W , estimated at node D1. For D1 to receive W1 reliably, we require
lim
n→∞Pr
(
W1 6= Wˆ1
)
= 0 (13)
In addition, since W1 must be kept secret from D2, we require
lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W1) = lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W1|Y n2 ) (14)
The achieved secrecy rate Re is defined as:
Re = lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W1) (15)
such that the conditions (13), (14) are fulfilled simultaneously.
9Let X1 =
√
bX˜1 and Y1 =
√
bY˜1. Then from (12), we have
Y1 = X1 +
√
abX2 +
√
bZ1
Y2 = X1 ±X2 + Z2
(16)
In the sequel, we will focus on this scaled model which will be more convenient to explain our
results.
There are two constraints on the input distribution to the channel model in (16): First, we
assume there is no common randomness shared by the encoders of S1 and S2. This means, the
input distribution to the channel is constrained to be
p (Xm1 ,W1) p (X
m
2 ) (17)
where m is the number of channel uses involved. Intuitively, this implies that if X2 is employed
to send interference to confuse the eavesdropper, its effect can not be mitigated by coding X1
via dirty-paper coding [36].
Second, the average power of Xi is constrained to be P¯i. If Xi,j is the jth component of Xi,
this means:
lim
m→∞
1
m
m∑
j=1
E
[
|Xi,j|2
]
≤ P¯i, i = 1, 2 (18)
When computing the secrecy rate Re for the model in (16), we consider its n symbol extension.
For the nested lattice code, n corresponds to the dimension of the lattice N . For the integer lattice
code, n = 1. When we design the coding scheme, we make sure that the signals transmitted
by node S2 for every n-channel use block are independent from the signals transmitted by it
during the other blocks. Hence, if every n channel uses are viewed as a single channel use, the
channel is in effect a memoryless wiretap channel. This allows us to leverage the following result
from reference [3]: Consider a memoryless wiretap channel Pr(Y, Z|X), where X is the channel
input, Y is the observation of the legitimate receiver, Z is the observation of the eavesdropper.
Then for a given input distribution Pr(X), any secrecy rate Re such that
0 ≤ Re ≤ [I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z)]+ (19)
is achievable. The notation [x]+ equals x if x ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise.
Adapting the result to our model, we observe that X, Y, Z corresponds to Xn1 , Y n1 , Y n2 respec-
tively. Hence (19) takes the following form:
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Fig. 2. The Gaussian Wiretap Channel with a Cooperative Jammer as a special case of the Multiple Access Channel with an
external eavesdropper, i.e., the MAC-WT [12].
Theorem 2: For a given n letter input distribution Pr(Xn1 ), with the assumption that the
signals transmitted by node S2 for every n-channel use block are independent from the signals
transmitted by it during the other blocks, any secrecy rate Re such that
0 ≤ Re ≤ 1
n
[I(Xn1 ; Y
n
1 )− I(Xn1 ; Y n2 )]+ (20)
is achievable for the model in (16).
It is important to note that (19) is proved with a random coding argument using joint typicality
decoder. However, as we will show later, here the support of the input distribution Pr(Xn1 ) is
restricted to the lattice points and hence structure is imposed on the codebook.
Remark 2: Note that even though (19) was originally derived for a channel model with discrete
alphabets, the same result readily holds for a channel model with continuous alphabets with
average power constraint at the transmitter [5, Section IV].
In this work, we will mainly be concerned about the high SNR behavior of the secrecy rate.
Namely,
Definition 1: The secure degree of freedom of the secrecy rate is defined as:
s.d.o.f. = lim sup
P¯i→∞,i=1,2
Re
1
2
log2
(
2∑
i=1
P¯i
) (21)
B. Relationship with Other Wiretap Channels
The significance of the Gaussian wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer is that it can
be considered as a special case of a large class of channel models with secret messages, as
explained in the following:
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Fig. 3. The Gaussian Wiretap Channel with a Cooperative Jammer as a special case of the two-user Interference Channel with
confidential messages, i.e., IFC-CM [26].
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Fig. 4. The Gaussian Wiretap Channel with a Cooperative Jammer as a special case of the Interference Channel with an
external eavesdropper, i.e., IFC-WT [27].
1) As shown in Figure 2, if node S2 has a confidential message W2 for D1, which must be
kept secret from D2, then the channel is the MAC-wiretap channel [12].
2) If node S2 has a confidential message W2 for D2, and the message must be kept secret
from D1, then the channel is the interference channel with confidential messages [26].
3) As shown in Figure 4, we can add another receiving node D0 to Figure 1, to which node
S2 wants to sent a confidential message W2. Again W2 must be kept secret from D2. Then
the channel becomes the interference channel with an external eavesdropper [27, Section
VI] [16].
Hence, it is clear that, any secrecy rate achieved in the Gaussian wiretap channel with a coopera-
tive jammer is an achievable individual rate for all the three multi-user channels mentioned above.
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An achievable secrecy rate region can be obtained by time sharing between these individual rates.
C. Gaussian Signaling
Reference [28] derived an achievable rate with Gaussian codebooks and power control for the
channel in Figure 1. It was shown, in the same reference that, with a Gaussian codebook, the
achievable secrecy rate Re converges to a constant when the power constraints of node D1 and
D2 goes to ∞. [28, Theorem 2]. This result implies that the achieved secure degree of freedom
is 0. It should be noted that in the achievable scheme of [28], node D2 sends a sequence from
a codebook randomly generated in an i.i.d. fashion according to a Gaussian distribution. This
is the worst noise from the eavesdropper’s (D2) perspective if Gaussian i.i.d. signaling is used
in X1, see, for example, [37, Lemma 2]. However, since the channel is fully connected, X2 is
also the worst noise for the intended receiver D1. This effect causes the secrecy rate to saturate,
leading to zero secure degree of freedom.
A moment’s thought reveals that if we allow structure in X2, while the eavesdropper may
potentially get more information about X1, the intended receiver D1 may benefit more by
exploiting the structure of the interference and neutralizing it more effectively as compared
to the eavesdropper. Hence, the overall secrecy rate can be improved. In the following, we will
show that this intuition is correct and use structured codes to derive the achievable secure degree
of freedom for the Gaussian wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer.
D. Main result
Theorem 3: For the channel model in Figure 1, a positive secure degree of freedom is
achievable when the following condition holds:
1) The channel is fully connected. Hence no channel gain is zero.
2) The channel is not degraded [10] or reversely degraded. This means the signal received
by the intended receiver can not be expressed as a degraded version, see [10, Section II],
of the signal received by the eavesdropper, and vice versa.
The theorem is proved by considering different range of values for
√
ab in (16). For almost
all values of
√
ab, Theorem 3 can be proved using the nested lattice coding scheme, which will
be shown in Theorem 4 and Corollary 2. However, there is still a set of channel gains which
has measure zero, where the secure degree of freedom achieved by Theorem 4 is zero. For these
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special cases, we shall use integer lattices to achieve a positive secure degree of freedom. These
cases will be discussed in Section V.
IV. ACHIEVABLE SECURE DEGREE OF FREEDOM WITH NESTED LATTICE CODES
We notice that any
√
ab,
√
ab 6= 0, can be represented in the following form:
√
ab = p/q + γ/q (22)
where p, q are positive integers, and −1 < γ < 1, γ 6= 0. In this case, the channel model (16)
can be expressed as:
qY1 = qX1 + (p+ γ)X2 + q
√
bZ1 (23)
Y2 = X1 ±X2 + Z2 (24)
Using this notation, we have the following theorem regarding the achievable secure degree of
freedom:
Theorem 4: The following secure degree of freedom is achievable using nested lattice codes
when 0 < |γ| < 0.5: [
0.25 log2 (α)− 1
1
2
log2 (αβ + 1)
]+
(25)
where
α =
1− 2γ2 +√1− 4γ2
2γ4
(26)
and
β = q2 + (p+ γ)2 (27)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
Remark 3: In the proof of Theorem 4, we use a layered coding scheme. That is to say that the
transmitted signal XNk , k = 1, 2 is the sum of codewords from M layers as shown in (69), where
XNk,i in (69) is the signal sent by the Sk in the ith layer. A nested lattice pair (Λi,Λc,i),Λc,i ⊂ Λi,
is assigned for each layer. XNk,i is computed from a lattice point from Λi ∩ V(Λc,i) as shown in
(70).
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Layered coding scheme with lattice codes was first used in [38] for a K-user interference
channel (K ≥ 3) without secrecy constraints. The difference here from [38] is as follows: In
[38], a sphere shaped lattice code is used for each layer. Here, for each layer, a nested lattice
code is used instead. As a result, the corresponding decoding algorithm and error probability
analysis is different. Reference [38] uses the results from [39]. The rate derivation in our work
follows reference [25].
Remark 4: In the proof of Theorem 4, we use the result from [3], i.e., (20), in (97). Xn1 in
(20) corresponds to the lattice points from all layers uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M , as shown in (97).
Remark 5: When computing the secrecy rate, we assume the eavesdropper knows (i) the
channel noise, as shown by (107), and (ii) the contribution to the received signal from each
layer, as shown by (108). For each layer, the information leaked to the eavesdropper takes the
form (4). This can be seen from (108) in the proof of Theorem 4. Hence with M layers, the
overall information leaked to the eavesdropper is bounded by M bit per channel use, with each
layer leaking at most 1 bit per channel use.
A consequence of Theorem 4 is as follows:
Corollary 2: For
√
ab, such that 2
√
ab is not an integer and 1/
√
ab is not an integer, the
secure degree of freedom given by Theorem 4 is positive.
Proof: We first verify Corollary 2 holds for interval 1 ≤ √ab ≤ 2. The value of (25) is
plotted Figure 5 in 1 <
√
ab < 2. To prove that (25) is positive in this range, it suffices to choose
(p = 1, q = 1), (p = 2, q = 1), (p = 3, q = 2), and let
√
ab = p/q+ γ/q. A higher secure degree
of freedom can be achieved by choosing other values for p, q, but for clarity, these curves are
not plotted in Figure 5.
Note that for a fixed pair of p, q, by changing γ, (25) takes the shape of a spur. Hence Figure 5
includes three such spurs. The value of (25) converges to 0.5 when γ converges to 0. However,
since γ 6= 0, the peak of the spur is not included. Hence a positive secure degree of freedom
cannot be gauranteed by Theorem 4 only when
√
ab = 1, 1.5 or 2.
We next argue that Corollary 2 holds for interval n ≤ √ab ≤ n + 1 for all integer n, n ≥ 1.
This follows from the fact that the denominator of (25) is always positive. Hence the positivity of
(25) is only determined by its numerator, which is only a function of γ. When n ≤ √ab ≤ n+1,
we can simply choose the following three pairs of (p, q): (p = n, q = 1), (p = n + 1, q = 1),
and (p = 2n + 1, q = 2). The positivity of (25) in this interval [n, n + 1] should be the same
15
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Fig. 5. The value of (25) when 1 <
√
ab < 2. The red dashed line is the contour.
as the positivity of (25) in interval [1, 2]. Since (25) is verified to be positive in interval [1, 2]
except for the cases stated in Corollary 2, the same case holds for interval [n, n + 1].
We next verify Corollary 2 holds for the interval 1/2 ≤ √ab ≤ 1. The value of (25) is plotted
in Figure 6. The two spurs in Figure 6 follows from choosing p = 1, q = 1, and p = 1, q = 2.
Finally we consider the interval 1/(n + 1) ≤ √ab ≤ 1/n for n ≥ 1. For this interval, we
can choose p = 1, q = n + 1 and p = 1, q = n. Again, since the positivity of (25) is only
determined by γ, Corollary 2 holds for this interval [1/(n + 1), 1/n] since it holds for interval
1/2 ≤ √ab ≤ 1.
Hence we have completed the proof of Corollary 2.
Remark 6: It should be noted that when 2
√
ab or 1/
√
ab is an integer, and
√
ab is not equal
to one of {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}, we can achieve a positive degree of freedom using nested lattice codes
also. This entails a different way to align the interference. This alignment scheme is not described
in detail because the secure degree of freedom achieved by integer lattice codes is better; see
also Remark 9.
V. COMPARISON WITH INTEGER LATTICE CODES
Another frequently used class of structured codes is the integer lattice codes [20], [23]. In
this section, we compute the secure degree of freedom using integer lattice codes and compare
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it with that of the nested lattice codes from Section IV.
A. Integer Lattice Codes
An integer lattice code with parameter Q is composed of points in the set [0, Q)∩Z where Z is
the set of all integers. The point can be scaled and shifted to obtain the actual transmitted signal.
Due to its simple structure, unlike nested lattice codes, for this code the rate of information
leaked to the eavesdropper can be computed precisely (rather than lower bounded). As will be
shown later, the information leaked to the eavesdropper can be bounded by the sum of several
terms, each with the following form:
f(Q) = I(X1;X1 ±X2) (28)
where Xi, i = 1, 2 is uniformly distributed over [0, Q)∩Z. f(Q) can be bounded by the following
lemma:
Lemma 1:
f(Q) ≤ 1
2
log2(2pie(
1
6
− 1
12Q2
)) <
1
2
log2(
pie
3
) < 0.8 (29)
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Proof: Equation (29) follows directly from [23, Lemma 12]. H(X1 +X2) can be bounded
as
H(X1 +X2) ≤ 1
2
log2(2pie(2P
′ +
1
12
)) (30)
where P ′ is the variance of Xk, k = 1, 2, which is given by
P ′ =
1
Q

Q−1∑
k=0
k2

−

Q−1∑
k=0
k/Q


2
=
Q2 − 1
12
(31)
Substituting (31) into (30) we get (29).
As shown by (29), the leakage rate is smaller than the 1-bit bound for the nested lattice code,
which suggests that integer lattice codes may be useful for cases where the secrecy rate offered
by the nested lattice code is 0.
Remark 7: Compared to the nested lattice code, the drawback of the integer lattice code is its
energy inefficiency at finite power. Moreover, typically integer lattices rely on certain number
theoretical results. Hence, they only yield good (secure) degree of freedom with very specific
channel gain configurations. Luckily, these channel gains happen to be the cases not covered by
nested lattice codes in Corollary 2.
B. Secure Degree of Freedom
1) When √ab is algebraic irrational: When √ab is algebraic irrational, we observe that the
achievable secure degree of freedom can be derived using a result from [23]:
Theorem 5: A secure degree of freedom of 1/2 is achievable when
√
ab is an algebraic
irrational number.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D.
Remark 8: When
√
ab = 1 and all channel gains are positive, the channel is degraded and
from the outer bound in [28], the secure degree of freedom is 0. Since algebraic irrational
numbers are dense on the real line, it follows that the secure degree of freedom is discontinuous
at
√
ab = 1.
Theorem 5 applies only when
√
ab is algebraic irrational, which is a set of measure 0 on the
real line. Hence other schemes are needed to cover the case where
√
ab is either rational or
transcendental.
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2) When
√
ab ≥ 2 or 1/√ab ≥ 1/2: For this range of √ab, we find Q-bit expansion scheme
similar to the one in [20] is useful in deriving the secure degree of freedom.
Theorem 6: Let Q =
√
ab if
√
ab ≥ 2. Otherwise, let Q = 1/√ab. Let ⌊Q⌋ denotes the
largest integer smaller than or equal to Q. Let Q ≥ 2. Then following secure degree of freedom
is achievable: [
1
2
log2 ⌊Q⌋
log2Q
− f(⌊Q⌋)
2 log2Q
]+
(32)
where f(Q) is defined in (28). (32) is lower bounded by
1
2
log2 ⌊Q⌋
log2Q
−
log2
(
2pie
(
1
6
)
− 1
12⌊Q⌋2
)
4 log2 (Q)
(33)
If Q = 2, (32) equals 0.25.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix E.
In Figure 7, we plot the secure degree of freedom achieved by Theorem 6. The actual
performance curve in Figure 7 corresponds to (32). The lower bound curve corresponds to
(33). The zigzag shape of the curve is a consequence of the ⌊ ⌋ operation on Q in (32). We
notice as
√
ab moves away from 1, the lower bound given by (33) becomes tighter, and the
secure degree of freedom converges to 0.5.
In Figure 8, we compare the secure degree of freedom achieved by nested lattice code with
those achieved by integer lattice coding scheme described in this section. As shown by Figure 8,
neither scheme dominates the other in performance for all channel gains. Nested lattice code
offers good secure degree of freedom near the peak of spurs, while integer lattice coding scheme
described in this section is at advantage when 2
√
ab are integers and
√
ab ≥ 2.
Remark 9: A coding scheme similar to the one described in this section can be constructed
with a nested lattice code. However, since we can only bound the secrecy rate rather than compute
precisely the rate of information leaked to the eavesdropper as we did for the integer lattice code,
the provable secure degree of freedom turns out to be smaller.
3) When
√
ab = 1: When Y2 = X1 +X2 + Z2, the channel is degraded. The secure degree
of freedom is known to be 0 [28].
However, when Y2 = X1 −X2 + Z2, we have the following result:
Theorem 7: When Y2 = X1 −X2 + Z2, a secure degree of freedom of 0.0548 is achievable.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix F.
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Fig. 7. Secure degree of freedom achieved by integer lattice coding scheme in Section V-B2
4) When
√
ab = 1.5: Here we mimic the coding scheme in Section IV when p = 1, q = 1.
Note that positive secure degree of freedom can not be achieved by the nested lattice code in
Section IV in this case. This is mainly a consequence of leaking 1 bit per layer in the layered
coding scheme. Here, we replace the nested lattice code with Q-bit expansion similar to the one
used in Section V-B2 and leverage the fact that integer lattice leaks less than 0.8 bit per layer
to show that a positive secure degree of freedom is achievable.
Theorem 8: When
√
ab = 1.5, a secure degree of freedom of 1/6 is achievable.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix G.
Remark 10: This scheme can be extended to the case when
√
ab = 1+1/Q with Q being an
integer greater than 2. In this case, we let ak,i = 0 if i mod 2 = 1. Otherwise ak,i is taken from
[0, Q− 1]∩Z. However, to make room for the carryovers, the least significant bit of the binary
representation of ak,i must be zero. Hence, 1 bit is lost per layer due to the carryovers. As a
result, the achieved secure degree of freedom turns out to be smaller than those achieved with
nested lattice codes. Similar coding schemes can be designed for other values of
√
ab. However,
it is difficult to find a uniform description of such codes that achieves a better performance than
that of nested lattice code.
Remark 11: At this point, given the description of all these coding schemes using structured
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codes, the careful reader might find it interesting to ask whether a Gaussian signaling scheme
can be devised by mimicking these schemes. We notice this would be difficult for the schemes in
Section V-B1 or Section IV, since Section V-B1 relies on [23] which uses results on Diophantine
approximation, and Section IV uses partial interference alignment which is difficult for codes
without a structure. We are then left with the schemes in Section V-B2 and Section V-B3.
In Sections V-B2 and V-B3, we use multi-level coding schemes. When computing the secrecy
rate, it is assumed the eavesdropper has perfect knowledge of the channel noise Z2 and the
part of received signals from each layer. Note that if a random codebook is used in this model
for each layer, revealing Z2 to the eavesdropper would essentially reveal to the eavesdropper
the codeword used at each layer. This can be seen by observing that the capacity region of a
2-user Gaussian MAC channel will expand to the whole two dimensional plane if the variance
of the channel noise goes to 0. On the other hand, if Z2 is not revealed to the eavesdropper,
then it would be difficult to compute the equivocation rate if a multi-level coding scheme is
used. Suppose, to solve this problem, we allocate a small amount of power at each layer to send
noise. Doing so would then cause problems at the intended receiver, since the noise can not be
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, Ptotal is the power of X1 or X2 in (16)
decoded and subtracted as the decoder proceeds from higher layers to lower layers. Therefore,
we conclude, even if a Gaussian signaling scheme could be eventually found, it would not be a
straightforward extensions from any of the coding schemes described in this paper.
VI. FINITE POWER SCENARIO
In practice, it is also interesting to look at how fast the asymptotic behavior, i.e., the secure
degree of freedom, kicks in as the power increases. In Figure 9, we plot the secrecy rate against
power when a = b =
√
2
3
. The power Ptotal is the variance of X1 or X2 in (16).
Since
√
ab =
√
2
3
is algebraic irrational, the integer lattice coding scheme from Section V-B1
provides the largest secure degree of freedom, which is 0.5. We use (134) to compute its secrecy
rate.
From (31) and (125), the average power of this coding scheme is given by
Ptotal = P
1/2+2εQ
2 − 1
12
(34)
The first term in (34) is due to the scaling factor P 1/4+ε in (125). We then choose different values
for ε and plot the largest achievable power rate pair region in terms of {10 log10 Ptotal, Re} in
Figure 9.
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For comparison, we plotted the largest secrecy rate offered by the Gaussian random codebook
when the power constraints go to ∞. Recall that when the power constraints go to ∞, the secrecy
rate is not affected by whether the channel is described by (12) or (16), which only affects the
power constraints. To leverage the result from [28], we use the channel model description in
(12). Since a = b =
√
2/3 < 1, (12) corresponds to the second case in [28, (11)]1. The power
unconstrained secrecy rate offered by the Gaussian random codebook is given by
lim
P¯k→∞,k=1,2
Re =
1
2
log2
1
ab
(35)
As shown by Figure 9, the secrecy rate offered by integer lattice is greater than the power
unconstrained Gaussian signaling scheme when 10 log10 Ptotal > 30.
We also plot, in Figure 9, the secrecy rate offered by the nested lattice code, by choosing
different p, q and the number of layers M . The secrecy rate is computed according to (111). Ptotal
is given by (96). As expected, different choices of p, q results in different slope of the curve,
hence different secure degree of freedom. When 10 log10 Ptotal < 60, the nested lattice code can
achieve a larger secrecy rate than integer lattice code due to its power efficiency. However, if
Ptotal keeps increasing, the secrecy rate offered by the integer lattice is the largest, due to its
high secure degree of freedom.
To summarize, these results demonstrate that the coding scheme presented in this paper can
outperform random Gaussian signaling at practical SNR values as well.
VII. CHANNEL GAIN MISMATCH
The coding schemes in previous sections require aligning lattice points at the eavesdropper,
which relies on accurate channel state information. It is conceivable that in practice such accurate
channel state information may be difficult to obtain and it is reasonable to ask if the nested lattice
coding scheme is still able to provide secrecy rate with imperfect channel state information. In
this section, we explain how to compute the secrecy rate in that case.
The channel model is shown in Figure 10. This is the same channel model we have been using
except now, the channel gain between S1 and D2 has an estimation error αi for the ith channel use.
For simplicity, we assume the remaining channels are estimated perfectly. The channel estimation
1 [28] only considers the case Y2 = X1 +X2 + Z2. However, since the Gaussian distribution is symmetric around zero, the
case Y2 = X1 −X2 + Z2 has the same secret rate with Gaussian input distributions.
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Fig. 10. Wiretap Channel with a Cooperative Jammer S2, where the channel gain between S1 and D1 has an estimation error
αi ∈ [−αmax, αmax] for the ith channel use. αi is known by D2 but not known by S1 or S2.
error, αi, is independent from the signal transmitted by node S1, and αi ∈ [−αmax, αmax].
αmax > 0. We also assume the eavesdropper, node D2, has perfect knowledge of αi, but the
other nodes only know αmax. In this setting, perfect channel state information at the eavesdropper
is obviously a pessimistic assumption, but it is insightful in that it will reveal a worst case
performance.
With these assumptions, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 9: Let P1 be the total power consumption of S1. If for a constant c > 0,
α2max ≤
c
P1
(36)
Then the same secure degree of freedom given by Theorem 4 is achievable.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix H.
Remark 12: Imperfect channel state information for other links, for example, on the link
between legitimate transmission pair S1 and D1 can be easily catered for, by using the existing
results for the model without secrecy constraints [40, Section IV].
VIII. COMPLEX CHANNEL GAINS
The role of complex channel gains in interference alignment has recently been considered [41].
For the purpose of completeness, in this section, we consider the channel model with complex
channel gains. We demonstrate that, in this case, by taking advantage of the phase difference
existing in the complex channel model, it is easier to achieve positive secure degree of freedom
using simple random coding arguments.
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The complex Gaussian wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer is shown in Figure 11.
Since the channel is fully connected, after normalization, the signals received by the two nodes
D1 and D2 can be expressed as
Y˜1 = X˜1 +
√
aejψaX2 + Z˜1
Y2 =
√
bejψbX˜1 +X2 + Z˜2
(37)
where j =
√−1. Z˜i, i = 1, 2 is a rotation invariant complex Gaussian random variable with unit
variance. This means E[|Z˜i|2] = 1. Let X1 =
√
bejψbX˜1 and Y1 =
√
bejψbY˜1. Let ψ = ψa + ψb.
Z1 = e
jψbZ˜1. Z2 = Z˜2. Then from (37) we have
Y1 = X1 +
√
abejψX2 +
√
bZ1
Y2 = X1 +X2 + Z2
(38)
The input distribution to this channel is constrained to be of the form given in (17). The power
constraints of this channel are given by (18). The secrecy rate and secure degree of freedom is
defined as in Section III-A. Given these, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 10: A secure degree of freedom of 1 is achievable if ψ 6= 0 or pi mod 2pi
Proof: Let ImXi = 0, i = 1, 2. Let cotx = cos x/ sin x. Then since ImY2 = ImZ2, ImY2
does not provide any information about W1 to the eavesdropper. Hence we can assume the
eavesdropper receives ReY2 only. Node D1 computes g(Y1) = ReY1 − cotψImY1. Then the
channel can be expressed as
g(Y1) = ReX1 +
√
b (ReZ1 − cotψImZ1) (39)
ReY2 = ReX1 + ReX2 + ReZ2 (40)
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By transmitting i.i.d. Gaussian noise via ReX2, the channel is equivalent to a Gaussian wiretap
channel. It is thus known that the following secrecy rate is achievable [4]:[
C
(
P1
(b csc2 ψ)/2
)
− C
(
P1
P2 + 1/2
)]+
(41)
where (b csc2 ψ)/2 is the variance of the noise term
√
b (ReZ1 − cotψImZ1). C(x) = 12 log2(1+
x). Pi, i = 1, 2, is the average power consumed by node Si. Let Pi = P¯i, i = 1, 2 and apply
the definition in (21), we observe that a secure degree of freedom of 1 is achievable for this
channel.
Remark 13: It is understood that if log2
(
2∑
i=1
P¯i
)
is used instead of 1
2
log2
(
2∑
i=1
P¯i
)
in the
definition of secure degree of freedom (21), the achieved degree of freedom should be changed
accordingly from 1 to 0.5.
Remark 14: Since the set of complex numbers is isomorphic to the set of scaled 2 × 2
orthogonal matrix, the result here can be interpreted as Gaussian codes being able to achieve
positive secure degree of freedom for a wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer where each
node has 2 antennas, the channel has real channel gains, and the channel matrix is a scaled
orthogonal matrix.
IX. CONCLUSION
Structured codes were shown recently as a useful technique to prove information theoretic
results. In this work, we showed that structured codes are also useful to prove secrecy results. We
first provided an analytical tool that is useful in computing secrecy rate for nested lattice codes.
Then, using integer lattice codes and nested lattice codes, we prove that a positive secure degree
of freedom is achievable for the Gaussian wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer and real
channel gains as long as the channel is not degraded and the channel is fully connected. Since
the channel is a special case of the MAC wiretap channel, the two-user interference channel with
confidential messages, and the two-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper, the
result means the secure degree of freedom for all these channels are positive as well as long as
the channel is not degraded and is fully connected. As a consequence of this high SNR result, we
are able to claim that, Gaussian signaling is not optimal for a large class of two-user Gaussian
channels.
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The result here provides further evidence that structured codes are useful. A list of examples
that structured codes outperform simple random coding arguments in non-secrecy problems can
be found in [17]. Employing structured codes in secrecy problems was first proposed by the
authors [42]. Up to date structured codes are found to be useful for relay channels due to the
possibility of compute-and-forward [17], [42], or for interference channels with more than two
users due to the possibility of interference alignment [23], [38], [43]. The result here provides
the example that structured codes are useful for two-user Gaussian channels as well.
An added practical value of our result is that it implies that the cooperation of just one node
is sufficient to achieve an arbitrarily large secrecy rate given enough power. Since large scale
cooperation involving multiple nodes is not essential, this fact enhances the robustness of the
network in an adverse environment.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let V be the fundamental region of the N-dimensional lattice Λ. For any set A, define αA
as αA = {αx : x ∈ A}. Then we have:
{
K∑
k=1
tk : tk ∈ V, k = 1...K} = KV (42)
By definition of the modulus Λ operation, we have
K∑
k=1
tk mod Λ =
K∑
k=1
tk + x, x ∈ Λ (43)
Therefore, the theorem is equivalent to finding the number of possible x in equation (43) for a
given
K∑
k=1
tk mod Λ such that tk ∈ V, k = 1...K. This, by (42), implies:
K∑
k=1
tk mod Λ− x ∈ KV, x ∈ Λ (44)
To do that, we need to know a little more about the structure of lattice Λ. Each point in a lattice,
by definition, can be represented in the following form [44]: x =
N∑
i=1
aivi, vi ∈ RN , ai ∈ Z.
{ai} is said to be the coordinates of the lattice point x under the basis {vi}.
Based on this representation, we can define the following relationship: Consider two points
x, y ∈ Λ, with coordinates {ai} and {bi} respectively. Then we say x ∼ y if ai = bi mod K,
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i = 1...N . It is easy to see the relationship ∼ is an equivalence relationship. Therefore, it defines
a partition over Λ. A partition defined in this way has the following property:
1) Depending on the values of ai − bi mod K, there are KN sets in this partition.
2) The sub-lattice KΛ is one set in the partition. The remaining KN − 1 sets are its cosets.
Let Ci denote any one of these cosets or KΛ. Then Ci can expressed as Ci = KΛ+ yi, yi ∈ Λ.
It is easy to verify that {x+KV, x ∈ Ci} is a partition of KRN + yi, which equals RN .
We now return to solve (43). Since Ci, i = 1...KN is a partition of Λ, (43) can be solved by
considering the following KN equations:
K∑
k=1
tk mod Λ− x ∈ KV, x ∈ Ci (45)
From (42), this means K∑
k=1
tk mod Λ ∈ x + KV for some x ∈ Ci. Since {x +KV, x ∈ Ci} is
a partition of RN , there is exactly one x ∈ Ci that meets this requirement. This implies for a
given
K∑
k=1
tk mod Λ, and a given coset Ci, (45) only has one solution for x. Since there are
KN such choices of Ci and hence KN such equations as shown in (45), (43) has at most KN
solutions. Hence each
K∑
k=1
tk mod Λ corresponds to at most KN points of
K∑
k=1
tk. This completes
the proof of the theorem.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
A. Some Useful Results on Decoding Nested Lattice Codes
In this section, we introduce some supporting results adapted from [25] which we will use in
proving Theorem 4.
Consider K + 1 N-dimensional lattices Λp,i, i = 0, ..., K, such that Λp,i ⊂ RN , i = 0, ..., K
is Rogers-good for covering and Poltyrev-good for channel coding. The definition for a lattice
to be Rogers-good can be found in [45, Section II.B]. The definition of Poltyrev-good can be
found in [45, Section III.D]. Reference [45] gaurantees the existence of Λp,i, i = 0, ..., K which
are good in the above sense.
Construct the fine lattice Λ as in [25, Section 7] such that Λp,0 ⊂ Λ. Hence {Λ,Λp,0} forms
a nested lattice pair.
Define independent random variables UN0 , UN1 , ...UNK , such that UNi , i = 0, ..., K is uniformly
distributed over the fundamental region of Λp,i.
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Define σ2(Ui), i = 0, ..., K as the variance per dimension of UNi . When N increases, we scale
Λ and Λp,i, i = 0, ..., K such that σ2(Ui) remains unchanged. Note that scaling does not affect
the goodness of a lattice.
Define ONi , i = 1, ..., K, as zero mean Gaussian random variables such that
ONi ∼ N (0, σ2(ONi )I) (46)
where I is an N×N identity matrix. σ2(ONi ) is a scalar chosen as the the variance per dimension
of a random variable uniformly distributed over the smallest ball covering V(Λp,i).
Define ε (Λp,i) is as in [25, (67)]:
ε (Λp,i) = log
(
Ru,i
Rl,i
)
+
1
2
log 2pieG∗N +
1
N
(47)
where Ru,i, Rl,i are the covering radius and effective radius of Λp,i respectively. G∗N is the
normalized average power of N-dimensional sphere and converges to 1
2pie
as N → ∞. Since
Λp,i is good for covering, we have Ru,iRl,i → 1 as N →∞ [25, Section 7]. Hence
lim
N→∞
ε (Λp,i) = 0 (48)
σ2(ONi ) is bounded by [25, Lemma 6]:
N
N + 2
σ2(Ui) ≤ σ2(ONi ) ≤
(
Ru,i
Rl,i
)2
σ2(Ui) (49)
Hence we have
lim
N→∞
σ2
(
ONi
)
= σ2 (Ui) (50)
Define ZN as a N-dimensional vector which is composed of zero mean i.i.d. Gaussian random
variables, each with variance σ2. ZN is independent from UNi , i = 1, ..., K.
Define tN as a lattice point in Λ∩V(Λp,0). tN is independent from ZN and UNi , i = 1, ..., K.
Define Y N as
Y N =
(
tN +
K∑
i=1
UNi + Z
N
)
mod Λp,0 (51)
for K ≥ 1, and
Y N =
(
tN + ZN
)
mod Λp,0 (52)
when K = 0.
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Define t˜N as the value for tN decoded from Y N using an Euclidean distance decoder:
t˜N = arg min
uN∈Λ∩V(Λp,0)
∥∥∥Y N − uN∥∥∥
2
(53)
Define the rate R0 of the nested lattice code book Λ ∩ V(Λp,0) as
R0 =
1
N
log2 |V (Λp,0) ∩ Λ| (54)
where |S| is the cardinality of a set S.
With these notations, we have the following results:
Lemma 2: If K = 0 and hence Y N is given by (52), and
R0 <
1
2
log2
(
σ2 (U0)
σ2
)
(55)
Then for each N dimensions there exist lattices Λ,Λp,0 such that
Pr
(
ZN /∈ V (Λ)
)
(56)
decreases exponentially fast with N .
Proof: The lemma follows by repeating the proof of [25, Theorem 5] when we choose the
scalar α defined therein to be 1 and consequently N′′ defined therein becomes N′′ = (1−α)U+
αN = N.
Lemma 2 can be extended into the following form:
Lemma 3: When K ≥ 1, and hence Y N is given by (51), and
R0 <
1
2
log2

 σ
2 (U0)
σ2 +
K∑
i=1
σ2 (Ui)

 (57)
Then for each N dimensions there exist lattices Λ,Λp,i, t = 0, ...K such that Pr(tN 6= t˜N)
decreases exponentially fast with N .
Proof: Let fX (x) denote the probability density function of any continuous random variable
X . We first use the following fact shown in [25, (200)]:
fUN
i
(x) ≤ eNε(Λp,i)fON
i
(x) (58)
which “approximates” UNi with the Gaussian random variable ONi . ε (Λp,i) is defined in (47).
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From (58), since UNi , i = 1, ..., K, ZN are independent, we have
f K∑
i=1
UN
i
+ZN
(x) ≤ e
N
K∑
i=1
ε(Λp,i)
f K∑
i=1
ON
i
+ZN
(x) (59)
which means:
Pr
(
K∑
i=1
UNi + Z
N /∈ V (Λ)
)
(60)
≤e
N
K∑
i=1
ε(Λp,i)
Pr
(
K∑
i=1
ONi + Z
N /∈ V (Λ)
)
(61)
From Lemma 2, since
K∑
i=1
ONi + Z
N is an i.i.d. Gaussian vector, we have, for a given K,
Pr
(
K∑
i=1
ONi + Z
N /∈ V (Λ)
)
(62)
decreases exponentially fast with N if
R0 <
1
2
log2

 σ
2 (U0)
σ2 + limN→∞
K∑
i=1
σ2 (ONi )

 (63)
which yields (57) because of (50). This, along with (48), means (61) decreases exponentially
fast with N . Therefore (60) decreases exponentially fast with N . Since (60) is an upper bound
on Pr(tN 6= t˜N ), we have proved Lemma 3.
The following result is adapted from [25, (89)].
Lemma 4: Define µ as
µ =
σ2 (U0)
σ2 +
K∑
i=1
σ2 (Ui)
(64)
Then if µ > 1, the probability
Pr
(
K∑
i=1
UNi + Z
N mod Λp,0 6=
K∑
i=1
UNi + Z
N
)
(65)
decreases exponentially fast with respect to N .
Proof: (65) is upper bounded by
Pr
(
K∑
i=1
UNi + Z
N /∈ V (Λp,0)
)
(66)
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which, in turn, by following similar steps which lead to (61), is upper bounded by
e
N
K∑
i=1
ε(Λp,i)
Pr
(
K∑
i=1
ONi + Z
N /∈ V (Λp,0)
)
(67)
Since Λp,0 is taken from the lattice code ensemble defined in [25, Section 7], according to [25,
(78)], we have
Pr
(
K∑
i=1
ONi + Z
N /∈ V (Λp,0)
)
≤ e−N(EP (µ)−oN (1)) (68)
where EP (µ) is the Poltyrev exponent defined in [25, (56)]. oN (1) is any function of N such
that limN→∞ oN(1) = 0 [25, Section 1]. Since Ep(µ) is positive for µ > 1, we have proved
Lemma 4.
B. The Coding Scheme in Theorem 4
Let XNk be the signal sent by node Sk over N channel uses. XNk is the sum of codewords
from M layers as shown below:
XNk =
M∑
i=1
XNk,i, k = 1, 2 (69)
XNk,i is the signal sent by the Sk in the ith layer.
For each layer, we use the nested lattice code described in Section II. Let {Λi,Λc,i} be nested
lattice pair assigned to layer i. This means Λc,i ⊂ Λi and Λc,i is Roger-good for covering and
Poltyrev-good for channel coding. A construction of such a nested lattice pair can be found in
[25, Section 7].
The signal XNk,i is computed according to this nested lattice pair as:
XNk,i =
(
uNk,i + d
N
k,i
)
mod Λc,i k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M (70)
where dNk,i is the dithering vector, uniformly distributed over V (Λc,i), perfectly known by all
receiving nodes and independently generated for each node, each layer and each block of N
channel uses. Let uNk,i be the lattice point such that:
uNk,i ∈ V (Λc,i) ∩ Λi, k = 1, 2 (71)
Note that both node S1 and S2 use the same lattice codebook for each layer.
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Define Ri as the rate of the codebook for the ith layer:
Ri =
1
N
log2 |V (Λc,i) ∩ Λi| (72)
Since dNk,i is uniformly distributed over V (Λc,i), the average power per dimension of the ith
layer Pi is given by:
Pi =
1
N vol(V (Λc,i))
∫
x∈V(Λc,i)
‖x‖22 dx (73)
where vol(V (Λc,i)) is the volume of the set V (Λc,i).
As shown in (23), Node D1 receives qY1, which, due to (69), can be written as:
qY1 =
M∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1 (74)
When decoding layer i, we assume the decoder at node D1 starts from:
i∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1 (75)
Node D1 first decode quN1,i + puN2,i mod Λc,i, then decode uN2,i.
Note that since p and q are both positive integers, quN1,i + puN2,i mod Λc,i ∈ Λi ∩ V(Λc,i).
In order to decode quN1,i + puN2,i mod Λc,i, the decoder computes
Yˆi =[
(
quN1,i + pu
N
2,i
)
+ γXN2,i +
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1 ] mod Λc,i (76)
from (75) since it knows dN1,i and dN2,i. Note that in (76), even though both the signal quN1,i +
puN2,i mod Λc,i and the noise term γXN2,i+
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p + γ)X
N
2,t
)
+q
√
bZN1 contains uN2,i, they
are independent because uN2,i is independent from XN2,i due to the dithering vector dN2,i. Hence
Lemma 3 applies. Note that the same technique was used in [25, Lemma 2].
Define Ai as
Ai =
i−1∑
t=1
(
q2 + (p+ γ)2
)
Pt + q
2b (77)
Then, according to Lemma 3, the probability that node D1 does not correctly decode quN1,i +
puN2,i mod Λc,i, decreases exponentially fast with the lattice dimension N if
Ri ≤ 1
2
log2
(
Pi
γ2Pi + Ai
)
(78)
After decoding quN1,i + puN2,i mod Λc,i, node D1 can recover:
[γXN2,i +
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p + γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1 ] mod Λc,i (79)
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from (76).
According to Lemma 4, as long as
Pi > γ
2Pi + Ai (80)
(79) equals
γXN2,i +
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1 (81)
with high probability. If (79) does not equal (81), a decoding error is said to occur.
Node D1 then evaluates the following expression from (81):[
k
(
γXN2,i +
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1
)
− γdN2,i
]
mod γΛc,i (82)
=
[
γuN2,i + (k − 1) γXN2,i + k
(
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1
)]
mod γΛc,i (83)
where the scalar k corresponds to α in [25, (13)]. Like [25], we choose k to minimize the
variance per dimension of the term
(k − 1) γXN2,i + k
(
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1
)
(84)
(84) is called the “effective noise” in [25] and its minimal variance per dimension with the
optimal k is given by:
γ2PiAi
γ2Pi + Ai
(85)
We then apply Lemma 3, which says node D1 can correctly decode uN2,i from (83) with high
probability if
Ri ≤ 1
2
log2

 γ2Pi(
γ2PiAi
γ2Pi+Ai
)

 = 1
2
log2
(
1 +
γ2Pi
Ai
)
(86)
After decoding uN2,i, node D1 can recover the following signal from (81):
i−1∑
t=1
(
qXN1,t + (p+ γ)X
N
2,t
)
+ q
√
bZN1 (87)
which will be used when decoding lower layers.
After describing the decoding procedure, we proceed to determine the power Pi and the rate
Ri of each layer. As in [38], [43], we let the right hand side of (78) equal the right hand side
of (86):
Pi
γ2Pi + Ai
= 1 +
γ2Pi
Ai
(88)
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It is easy to check that (88) has the following solution2:
Pi = αAi (89)
where α = 1−2γ
2+
√
1−4γ2
2γ4
. This leads to (26) in Theorem 4. For α to be real, we require
1− 4γ2 ≥ 0, which means |γ| ≤ 0.5.
By solving (89) and (77), we find that Pi is given by:
Pi = α (αβ + 1)
i−1 q2b (90)
where β = q2 + (p + γ)2. This leads to (27).
For this power allocation, Ai is given by
Ai = (αβ + 1)
i−1 q2b (91)
Due to (88), Ri can be found by averaging (78) and (86) and substituting (90) and (91) into the
result:
Ri =
0.5
2
log2
(
Pi
γ2Pi + Ai
)
+
0.5
2
log2
(
1 +
γ2Pi
Ai
)
(92)
=
0.5
2
log2
(
Pi
Ai
)
(93)
=0.25 log2 (α) (94)
It remains to check the requirement (80). To do that, we substitute (89) into (80) and get
(
1− γ2
)
α > 1 (95)
where α can be expressed in terms of γ as shown in (26). It can be verified that the left hand
side of (95) is always greater than 1 if |γ| < 0.5. Hence (80) is fulfilled.
The total power consumed by node Si can be computed from (90) and is given by
M∑
t=1
Pt =
(αβ + 1)M − 1
β
q2b (96)
Having established the rate of the nested lattice codebook at each layer in (94), we next compute
the secrecy rate. For this purpose, we require that uN2,i, i = 1, ...,M are independent and are also
independent from uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M . Each uN2,i, i = 1, ...,M must be uniformly distributed over
2The other solution is when α = 1−2γ
2
−
√
1−4γ2
2γ4
. It turns out this solution does not achieve positive secrecy rate.
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V (Λc,i)∩Λi. Then, if we view uNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M as the inputs to the channel, the signal
transmitted by node S2 is independent between every block of N-channel uses. Hence Theorem
2 applies. This means any secrecy rate Re such that
0 ≤ Re ≤ [ lim
N→∞
1
N
(I(uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M ; Y
N
1 , d
N
k,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M)−
I(uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M ; Y
N
2 , d
N
k,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M))]
+ (97)
is achievable. Hence we only need to find a lower bound to the right hand side of (97). To do
that, we first need to determine the distribution of uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M . Here we choose it as the
same distribution we chose for uN2,i, i = 1, ...,M . This means uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M are independent
and each of them is uniformly distributed over V (Λc,i) ∩ Λi. For this distribution,
lim
N→∞
1
N
I(uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M ; Y
N
1 , d
N
k,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M) (98)
≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M) =
M∑
i=1
Ri (99)
On the other hand, we know that, for a given M , uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M can be decoded from
{Y N1 , dNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M} using the decoding procedure described in this proof. By
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, the probability of decoding error decreases exponentially fast with
respect to N . If Pe denotes the probability of decoding error, then, by Fano’s inequality [46],
we have
1
N
H
(
uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M |Y N1 , dNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M
)
(100)
≤ 1
N
(
1 + PeH(u
N
1,i, i = 1, ...,M)
)
=
1
N
+ Pe
M∑
i=1
Ri (101)
Therefore
lim
N→∞
1
N
I(uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M ; Y
N
1 , d
N
k,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M) (102)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M)−H
(
uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M |Y N1 , dNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M
)
) (103)
≥
M∑
i=1
Ri − 1
N
− Pe
M∑
i=1
Ri (104)
By letting N →∞, (99) and (104) imply:
lim
N→∞
1
N
(I(uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M ; Y
N
1 , d
N
k,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M) =
M∑
i=1
Ri (105)
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where Ri is given by (94).
The second term in (97) can be upper bounded as follows:
1
N
I
(
uN1,i, i = 1...M ; Y
N
2 , d
N
k,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
(106)
≤ 1
N
I
(
uN1,i, i = 1...M ;X
N
1 ±XN2 , dNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
(107)
≤ 1
N
M∑
i=1
I
(
uN1,i;X
N
1,i ±XN2,i, dNk,i, k = 1, 2
)
(108)
≤M (109)
(107) follows from the fact that telling the eavesdropper the channel noise ZN2 will not harm its
ability to obtain more information about the confidential message. (108) is because the jamming
signal XN2,i and the dithering noise dNk,i of different layers are independent from each other.
Finally, we apply (5)-(10) to each term inside the sum in (108) to obtain (109).
Substituting (105) and (109) into (97), we find that the following secrecy rate is achievable.
Re = [
M∑
i=1
Ri −M ]+ (110)
= [(0.25 log2(α)− 1)M ]+ (111)
The secure degree of freedom is therefore given by
lim
P→∞
Re
1
2
log2 P
= lim
M→∞
[
M∑
i=1
Ri −M ]+
1
2
log2
∑M
t=1 Pt
(112)
=
[
0.25 log2 (α)− 1
1
2
log2 (αβ + 1)
]+
(113)
Hence, we have proved Theorem 4.
Remark 15: dNk,i can be replaced with deterministic vectors. The proof is given in Appendix
C.
Remark 16: We scaled the signal by k in (83) before performing the modulus operation.
Doing so offers a slight gain in secure degree of freedom than just choosing k = 1.
The scaling by k operation can also be done in (76). However, the optimal scaling factor has
a more complicated expression and it is difficult to derive an analytical expression for the secure
degree of freedom if this approach is followed.
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APPENDIX C
REPLACING RANDOM DITHERING VECTORS WITH DETERMINISTIC VECTORS
In this appendix, we shall demonstrate that the dithering noise dNi,k in Appendix B can be
replaced with deterministic vectors. For a fix number of layers M , let ei denotes the binary
random variable such that ei = 1 denote the event that a decoding error has occurred at layer
i given no decoding error has occurred at upper layers j, M ≤ j > i. There are three types of
error events that results in ei = 1, depending on:
1) whether node D1 can decode quN1,i + puN2,i mod Λc,i from Yˆi given by (76) correctly.
2) whether (79) equals (81).
3) whether node D1 can decode uN2,i from (83) correctly.
By Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, the probability of each error event goes to 0 exponentially fast as
the dimension of the lattice N goes to ∞. Hence from the union bound, we have:
Pr(ei) < exp(−Nα˜i) (114)
where α˜i is the error exponent of the error event {ei = 1}. Let α˜ = mini α˜i. Let e be the
binary random variable such that e = 1 means a decoding error has occurred. Then {e = 1} =
∪M−1i=0 {ei = 1}. From the union bound, we have:
Pr(e) < M exp(−Nα˜) (115)
Another way to view this result, as described in [35], is that (115) is the average performance
of an ensemble of codebooks. Each codebook is denoted by Ck, k = 1, 2 with parameter dNk,i, i =
1, ...,M, k = 1, 2, where
Ck = {
(
uNk,i + d
N
k,i
)
mod Λc,i : u
N
k,i ∈ V (Λc,i) ∩ Λi, i = 1, ...,M} (116)
Each term inside the bracket on the right hand of (116), which is
(
uNk,i + d
N
k,i
)
mod Λc,i, denotes
the codebook used for each layer. Although the transmitted signal is the sum of the codewords
from the codebook of each layer, they can be differentiated by the receiver due to a careful
power and rate allocation between layers as shown in Appendix B.
Note that because of the nested structure,
(
uNk,i + d
N
k,i
)
mod Λc,i contains the same number
of lattice points regardless of the choice of dNk,i [35]. Therefore, Ck has same rate regardless
of the choice of dNk,i. That said, this choice may lead to different average power and error
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probability performance. (115) can then be interpreted as the error probability averaged over the
code ensembles and can be expressed as
EC1,C2 [Pr(e)] < M exp(−Nα˜) (117)
where EC1,C2[ ] means the expectation considering the codebook C1, C2 as being random. From
Markov inequality, at least (1− ε) fraction of the codebook C1 has the following property:
EC2 [Pr(e)|C1 = C∗1 ] <
1
ε
EC1,C2[Pr(e)] (118)
Let P ′i be the average power of a certain codebook Ci and P¯ ′i be the average power of the
codebook ensemble. At least 2ε fraction of the codebook C1 has the following property:
P ′1 ≤
1
1− 2εP¯
′
1 (119)
Therefore, there must exists one codebook C∗1 that meets (118) and (119) simultaneously. Let
C1 = C∗1 to be this codebook, and apply the same argument above to C2. Then there must exists
one codebook C∗2 such that
Pr(e|C1 = C∗1 , C2 = C∗2) <
1
ε
EC2 [Pr(e)|C1 = C∗1 ] (120)
P ′2 ≤
1
1− 2εP¯
′
2 (121)
Note that this is a consequence of the fact that C1 is independent from C2. Therefore conditioning
on C∗1 does not change the distribution of C2. Hence conditioning on C∗1 , the average power of
C2 ensemble remains to be P¯ ′2.
Now choose ε as a function of N such that
lim
N→∞
1
ε2
EC1,C2[Pr(e)] = 0 (122)
lim
N→∞
ε = 0 (123)
which is possible by letting ε = 1/N , because for a given M , EC1,C2 [Pr(e)] decreases exponen-
tially fast with N as shown by (117). From (118) and (120), we know for each choice ε, there
exists a pair of codeword C∗1 , C∗2 such that
Pr (e|C1 = C∗1 , C2 = C∗2) <
1
ε2
EC1,C2 [Pr (e)] (124)
and the power consumption meets the (119) and (121). This, along with (122) and (123), means
that there must exists a pair of codebooks (C1 = C∗1 , C2 = C∗2) that meet both the error probability
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requirement and the power constraint requirement when N goes to ∞. This means that the
dithering vector {dNi,k} in this work can be deterministic vectors.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
In this appendix we provide the proof for Theorem 5. We use the same integer lattice codebook
as in [23, Theorem 1]. Let ΛP,ε be the scalar lattice defined as:
ΛP,ε =
{
x : x = P 1/4+εz, z ∈ Z
}
(125)
The codebook CP,ε is given by:
CP,ε = ΛP,ε ∩
[
−
√
P,
√
P
]
(126)
where P = min{P¯1, P¯2}. Hence
⌈
−P 1/4−ε
⌉
≤ z ≤
⌊
P 1/4−ε
⌋
, where ⌈ ⌉ and ⌊ ⌋ denote the
up and down rounding operations respectively. |CP,ε| ≥ 2
(
P 1/4−ε − 1
)
+ 1 = 2P 1/4−ε − 1. This
means that, for large enough P , we can write:
log2 |CP,ε| ≥ log2
(
2P 1/4−ε − 1
)
≥ log2
(
P 1/4−ε
)
(127)
The same codebook is used by both nodes S1 and S2. The codeword transmitted by node S1
is chosen based on the secret message W1. The codeword transmitted by node S2 is chosen
independently according to a uniform distribution over CP,ε.
Since the input X2 from S2 is i.i.d., the channel can then be shown to be equivalent to a
memoryless wiretap channel [3]. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4, we use Theorem 2 with
n = 1, which states any secrecy rate Re such that
0 ≤ Re ≤ [I (X1; Y1)− I (X1; Y2)]+ (128)
is achievable. Hence to compute the achievable secrecy rate, we need to find a lower bound to
the right hand side of (128).
According to [23, Theorem 1], p(X1) is chosen to be a uniform distribution over CP,ε. Therefore
H (X1) = log2 (|CP,ε|) (129)
From [23, Theorem 1], when
P >
1
a2b2
(130)
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we have
H (X1|Y1) ≤ 1 + 2 exp
(
−P
2ε
8b
)
log2 (|CP,ε|) (131)
The fact that
√
ab is algebraic irrational is used in [23, Theorem 1], which uses a result from
Diophantine approximation. (130) comes from [23, Lemma 2]. b in (131) comes from the fact
that the variance of the Gaussian noise contained in Y1 is b instead of unity.
From (129) and (131), we have:
I (X1; Y1) ≥
(
1− 2 exp
(
−P
2ε
8b
))
log2 (|CP,ε|)− 1 (132)
Since CP,ε is simply a scaled and shifted version of the integer lattice code, we can use Lemma
1 to bound I (X1; Y2):
I (X1; Y2) ≤ I (X1; Y2, Z2) = I (X1;X1 ±X2) = f(Q) ≤ 0.8 (133)
where f(Q) is defined in (28). Q is determined by the range of z in (125). Hence Q =
2⌊P 1/4−ε⌋ + 1. The last inequality in (133) follows from Lemma 1. Using (132) (133), and
(127), we find (128) is lower bounded by
[
(
1− 2 exp
(
−P
2ε
8b
))(
1
4
− ε
)
log2 (P )− 1− f(Q)]+ (134)
for sufficiently large P . Since 0 ≤ f(Q) < 0.8, and ε can be any value between (0, 1/4), using
the definition in (21), we find the achieved secure degree of freedom is 0.5. Hence we have
completed the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
In this appendix we provide the proof for Theorem 6. We begin by considering the case when
√
ab ≥ 2. Let
Xk =
√
P0
M−1∑
i=0
ak,iQ
2i, k = 1, 2 (135)
where M is a constant positive integer, P0 is a constant scaling factor. Both are related to the
variance of Xk. ak,i is uniformly distributed over [0, ⌊Q⌋−1]∩Z. Due to the range limit imposed
on ak,i, we observe that ak,i is uniquely determined by Xk.
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The signal received by node D1 is given by
Y1 =
√
P0(
M−1∑
i=0
a1,iQ
2i +
M−1∑
i=0
a2,iQ
2i+1) +
√
bZ1 (136)
We then derive a lower bound to [I(X1; Y1)− I(X2; Y2)]+ as we did for Theorem 5.
I(X1; Y1) can be lower bounded by following a similar derivation from [23, Theorem 1].
Define Ck = {
√
P0
M−1∑
i=0
ak,iQ
2i : ak,i ∈ [0, ⌊Q⌋ − 1] ∩ Z}, k = 1, 2. We use the same maximum
likelihood decoder used in [23, Theorem 1]:
Yˆ1 = arg min
X1+QX2, s.t. Xk∈Ck,k=1,2
|Y1 − (X1 +QX2)|2 (137)
It is clear that given Yˆ1, there is a unique pair of X1, X2 such that X1 + QX2 = Yˆ1. Let this
mapping from Yˆ1 to X1 be f . Define binary random variable A such that
A =


0 if |√bZ1| <
√
P0/2
1 otherwise
(138)
Note that if A = 0, we have X1 = f(Yˆ1). For this definition of A, we have
H
(
X1|Yˆ1
)
≤H
(
X1, A|Yˆ1
)
(139)
=H
(
A|Yˆ1
)
+H
(
X1|Yˆ1, A
)
(140)
≤1 + Pr (A = 1)H
(
X1|Yˆ1, A = 1
)
+ Pr (A = 0)H
(
X1|Yˆ1, A = 0
)
(141)
=1 + Pr (A = 1)H
(
X1|Yˆ1, A = 1
)
(142)
≤1 + Pr (A = 1)H (X1|A = 1) (143)
=1 + Pr (A = 1)H (X1) (144)
(144) is because A is independent from X1. Pr(A = 1) is bounded as follows:
Pr (A = 1) =
∫
|t|≥√P0/2
1√
2pib
exp
(
− t
2
2b
)
dt ≤ 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
)
(145)
Substituting it into (144), we get:
H
(
X1|Yˆ1
)
≤ 1 + 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
)
H (X1) (146)
Therefore I(X1; Y1) is lower bounded as:
I (X1; Y1) ≥ I
(
X1; Yˆ1
)
≥
(
1− 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
))
H (X1)− 1 (147)
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For I(X1; Y2), we have:
I(X1; Y2) ≤ I(X1;X1 ±X2) ≤
M−1∑
i=0
I(a1,i; a1,i ± a2,i) =Mf(⌊Q⌋) (148)
Given X1 as defined in (135), we have H(X1) = M log2 ⌊Q⌋. Substituting it into (147) and
combining it with (148), we find, from (128), the following secrecy rate is achievable.
Re = [M(1 − 2 exp(−P0
8b
))(log2 ⌊Q⌋)− 1−Mf(⌊Q⌋)]+ (149)
The transmission power is given by:3
V ar [Xk] = P0
(⌊Q⌋2 − 1
12
)
M−1∑
i=0
Q4i (150)
= P0
(⌊Q⌋2 − 1
12
)
Q4M − 1
Q4 − 1 (151)
The secure degree of freedom can then be computed by substituting the transmission power
(151) and the secrecy rate (149) into (21), which yields:
lim
M→∞
[
((
1− 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
))
log2 ⌊Q⌋ − f(⌊Q⌋)
)
M ]+
1
2
log2 (Q
4M)
(152)
= [
1
2
(
1− 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
))
log2 ⌊Q⌋
log2Q
− f(⌊Q⌋)
2 log2 (Q)
]+ (153)
(153) can be made arbitrarily close to (32) by choosing a large enough P0. (33) then follows
from (32) via Lemma 1.
When Q = 2, it can be verified that f(⌊Q⌋) = 0.5, and (153) can be made to be arbitrarily
close to 1/4.
The case of 1/
√
ab ≥ 2 can be proved in a similar fashion. Let 1/√ab = Q and let Xk =
Q
√
P0
M−1∑
i=0
ak,iQ
2i
, k = 1, 2. Then all previous derivations apply. In particular, (136) becomes:
Y1 =
√
P0(
M−1∑
i=0
a1,iQ
2i+1 +
M−1∑
i=0
a2,iQ
2i) +
√
bZ1 (154)
and (137) becomes:
Yˆ1 = arg min
X1+X2/Q, s.t. Xk∈Ck ,k=1,2
|Y1 − (X1 + 1
Q
X2)|2 (155)
3In case it is desired for Xk to have zero mean, we can simply shift Xk by a constant, which will not alter the secrecy rate.
43
The achieved secrecy rate remains the same. The transmission power is scaled by Q2:
V ar [Xk] = Q
2P0
(⌊Q⌋2 − 1
12
)
Q4M − 1
Q4 − 1 , k = 1, 2 (156)
Hence the secure degree of freedom is still given by (33) when Q > 2 and 0.25 when Q = 2.
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Let Xk be given by (135) in Section E with Q = 2. However, unlike what we did in (135),
ak,i is not uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. Instead, we choose its distribution to maximize
I(a1,i; a1,i + a2,i)− I(a1,i; a1,i − a2,i) (157)
which is about 0.1095 when Pr(a1,i = 1) = 0.1443, Pr(a2,i = 1) = 0.8557. We next derive
the achievable secrecy rate by deriving a lower bound on [I(X1; Y1) − I(X2; Y2)]+. Define
Ck = {
√
P0
M−1∑
i=0
ak,iQ
2i : ak,i ∈ {0, 1}}, k = 1, 2. Define f(Y1) as
f(Y1) = arg min
X1+X2:Xk∈Ck,k=1,2
|Y1 − (X1 +X2)|2 (158)
Then:
I (X1;X1 +X2)− I (X1; f (Y1))
≤I (X1;X1 +X2|f (Y1)) (159)
≤H (X1 +X2|f (Y1)) (160)
≤1 + 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
)
H (X1 +X2) (161)
Inequality (161) follows from (139)-(144) with Yˆ1 replaced by f(Y1) defined in (158), and X1
replaced with X1 +X2. Then we have
I (X1; Y1)
≥I (X1; f (Y1)) (162)
≥
(
1−
(
2 exp
(
−P0
8b
)))
H (X1 +X2)−H (X2)− 1 (163)
=I (X1;X1 +X2)− 1− 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
)
H (X1 +X2) (164)
=
M−1∑
i=0
I (a1,i; a1,i + a2,i)− 1− 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
)M−1∑
i=0
H (a1,i + a2,i) (165)
44
In (163) we use the fact that X1 is independent from X2 and apply the result from (161). (165)
is because there is a one-to-one mapping between X1 +X2 and {a1,i + a2,i, i = 0, ...,M − 1}.
For I(X1; Y2), we have
I (X1; Y2) ≤ I (X1;X1 −X2) (166)
≤
M∑
i=1
I (a1,i; a1,i − a2,i) (167)
Therefore
I (X1; Y1)− I (X1; Y2)
≥
M∑
i=1
(I (a1,i; a1,i + a2,i)− I (a1,i; a1,i − a2,i))− 1− 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
)M−1∑
i=0
H (a1,i + a2,i) (168)
=M0.1095− 1− 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
)
MH (a1,i + a2,i) (169)
Let Va,k be the variance of ak,i. Then we have
V ar [Xk] = P0Va,k
Q4M − 1
Q2 − 1 , k = 1, 2 (170)
Hence the secure degree of freedom is given by:
lim
M→∞
[I (X1; Y1)− I (X1; Y2)]+
1
2
log2 V ar [Xk]
(171)
=[0.0548− exp
(
−P0
8b
)
H (a1,i + a2,i)]
+ (172)
We can always choose a large enough P0 to make the secure degree of freedom to be arbitrarily
close to 0.0548. This completes the proof of Theorem 7.
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Let Xi be:
Xk =
√
P0
3M−1∑
i=0
ak,iQ
i, k = 1, 2 (173)
where Q = 2. M is a positive integer and P0 is a positive constant as defined in the proof of
Theorem 6. Choose ak,i such that
ak,i = 0, if i mod 3 = 1 or 2 (174)
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otherwise ak,i is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. Here ak,i is forced to be zero at i mod 3 =
1 or 2 to make room for 0.5a2,j , ∀j mod 3 = 0 and the carry-over from a1,j+a2,j, ∀j mod 3 = 0.
Define Ck as the collection of points Xk defined by (173). Define Yˆ1 as
Yˆ1 = arg min
X1+1.5X2, s.t. Xk∈Ck ,k=1,2
|Y1 − (X1 + 1.5X2)|2 (175)
With this new definition of Yˆ1, the same derivation that leads to (147) applies, where H(X1) =
M . On the other hand:
I (X1; Y2) ≤ I (X1;X1 ±X2) ≤
3M−1∑
i=0
I (a1,i; a1,i ± a2,i) = 0.5M (176)
From (147), (176) and (128), the following secrecy rate is achievable:[(
1− 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
))
M − 1− 0.5M
]+
(177)
The transmission power is given by
V ar [Xk] = P0
Q2 − 1
12
M−1∑
i=0
Q6i =
P0
4
Q6M − 1
Q6 − 1 (178)
for Q = 2. The secure degree of freedom is hence given by:
lim
M→∞
(
1− 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
))
M − 1− 0.5M
1
2
log2 (Q
6M )
(179)
=
1
3
(
1− 2 exp
(
−P0
8b
)
− 0.5
)
(180)
which can be made arbitrarily close to 1/6 by choosing a large enough P0.
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We prove Theorem 9 by showing that the loss in secrecy rate due to the imperfectness of
channel state information can be bounded by a constant.
The challenge in proving this result arises due to the fact that the assumption on αi essentially
makes the channel in Figure 10 an arbitrary wiretap channel for which an explicit calculation
of the secrecy rate is difficult [47]. To work around this problem, we consider the channel in
Figure 12 and present the following Lemma.
Lemma 5: Any secrecy rate achievable in Figure 12 is also achievable in Figure 10 with the
same coding scheme.
46
αmax
S1
S2
√
bZ1
D1
D2
X1
X2
Y1
Y2
W1 Wˆ1
W1
1
1
√
ab
±1
Z2
Fig. 12. Figure 10 with an enhanced eavesdropper channel
Proof: We need to show the confidential message W1 is reliably received by D1 and the
secrecy constraint (14) is met. The first requirement is met automatically since that the signal
received by D1 remains the same. Hence we can start with a coding scheme that reliably transmits
W1 from S1 to D1 for Figure 12 and prove that the secrecy constraint (14) is fulfilled with this
coding scheme for Figure 10. For the coding scheme, the layered nested lattice codes from
Theorem 4 is used.
Let n be the total number of channel uses. Let D be the n×n diagonal matrix, whose diagonal
element at the ith row and ith column is αi. Define a diagonal matrix D¯ such that D¯ is obtained
from D by replacing the 0 elements on its diagonal line with αmax. Define Zn3 as independent
random variable with the same Gaussian distribution as Zn2 . Zni , i = 2, 3 are independent. Then
the mutual information between W1 and the knowledge of the eavesdropper in Figure 10 can be
upper bounded as follows:
0 ≤I
(
W1; Y
n
2 , d
n
k,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M,D
)
(181)
≤I
(
W1;X
n
1 ±Xn2 + Zn2 +DXn1 , dnk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M,D
)
(182)
=I
(
W1;X
n
1 ±Xn2 + Zn2 +DXn1 , D, dnk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
(183)
≤I
(
W1;X
n
1 ±Xn2 , Zn2 +DXn1 , D, dnk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
(184)
≤I
(
W1;X
n
1 ±Xn2 , Zn2 + D¯Xn1 , D¯, dnk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
(185)
=I

W1;Xn1 ±Xn2 , D¯αmaxZn2 +
√√√√1− D¯2
α2max
Zn3 + D¯X
n
1 , D¯, d
n
k,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M

 (186)
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≤I
(
W1;X
n
1 ±Xn2 ,
D¯
αmax
Zn2 + D¯X
n
1 , D¯, d
n
k,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
(187)
=I
(
W1;X
n
1 ±Xn2 , Zn2 + αmaxXn1 , D¯, dnk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
(188)
Note that (188) is exactly the same as the mutual information between W1 and the eavesdropper’s
knowledge in Figure 12. Hence if
lim
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W1;X
n
1 ±Xn2 , Zn2 + αmaxXn1 , D¯, dnk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
= 0 (189)
Then we must have:
lim
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W1; Y
N
2 , d
N
k,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M,D
)
= 0 (190)
This means that to obtain the secrecy rate for Figure 10, we can as well compute the secrecy
rate for Figure 12.
Note that with the layered nested lattice coding scheme in Theorem 4, when each lattice point
is viewed as a single channel use, and the channel in Figure 12 is equivalent to a memoryless
wiretap channel. Then according to Theorem 2, the following secrecy rate Re is achievable:
0 ≤ Re ≤ [ lim
N→∞
1
N
(I(uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M ; Y
N
1 , d
N
k,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M)−
I(uN1,i, i = 1, ...,M ;X
N
1 ±XN2 , αmaxXN1 + ZN2 , dNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M))]+
(191)
The first term in (191) is still given by (105) since the signal received by D1 remains the same.
The second term in (191) can be upper bounded as follows:
1
N
I
(
uN1,i, i = 1...M ;X
N
1 ±XN2 , ZN2 + αmaxXN1 , dNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
(192)
=
1
N
I
(
uN1,i, i = 1...M ;X
N
1 ±XN2 , ZN2 + αmaxXN1 |dNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
(193)
≤ 1
N
I
(
uN1,i, i = 1...M ;X
N
1 ±XN2 |dNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
(194)
+
1
N
I
(
uN1,i, i = 1...M,X
N
1 ±XN2 ;ZN2 + αmaxXN1 |dNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
(195)
=
1
N
I
(
uN1,i, i = 1...M ;X
N
1 ±XN2 |dNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
+
1
N
I
(
uN1,i, i = 1...M ;Z
N
2 + αmaxX
N
1 |dNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M
)
(196)
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(196) is because {XN1 ±XN2 }−{uN1,i, i = 1...M, dNk,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1...M}−{ZN2 +αmaxXN1 } is
a Markov chain. The first term in (196) is shown by (107)-(109) to be bounded by M . Hence
we only need to bound the second term. This term is bounded by:
1
N
I
(
uN1,i, d
N
k,i, k = 1, 2, i = 1, ...,M ;Z
N
2 + αmaxX
N
1
)
(197)
≤ 1
N
I
(
XN1 ;Z
N
2 + αmaxX
N
1
)
(198)
≤C
(
α2maxP1
)
(199)
where C(x) = 1
2
log2(1+x) is the channel capacity formula of average power constrained AWGN
channel. P1, the total transmission power consumed by S1, is given by (96). The inequality (199)
is due to the fact that for additive channel with i.i.d. Gaussian noise the mutual information is
maximized by Gaussian input distribution for given transmitter power constraint.
Applying (199), (107)-(109), and (105) in (191), we find the secrecy rate is given by
Re = [(0.25 log2(α)− 1)M − C
(
α2maxP1
)
]+ (200)
Compared it to (111), the loss in secrecy rate is bounded by C (α2maxP1), which is bounded by
a constant per the condition stated in Theorem 9. Hence the achieved secure degree of freedom
remains the same as Theorem 4.
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